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HISTORY

Montana entered a new era in the adjudication of workers'
compensation cases with the passage of House Bill 100' by the 1975
Legislature. The bill created the Office of the Workers' Compensation Judge, terminating the prior adjudication procedure used in
disputed cases involving employees injured in "the course and
scope of their employment." Growing out of the public outcry
raised in response to a much-publicized scandal involving the Division of Workers' Compensation and the attorneys who handled
cases before the division, the bill was meant to provide a legislative
solution to abuses within the system.
* Montana Workers' Compensation Judge; B.A., University of Montana, 1955; L.L.B.,
University of Montana School of Law, 1955.
** B.A., Concordia College, 1975; J.D., University of Montana School of Law, 1981.

1. 1975 Mont. Laws ch. 537, codified at

MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED

[hereinafter cited

as MCA) §§ 2-15-1014, 39-71-2901 through -2909 (1979).
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The legislation did not provide a perfect solution, however. In
fact, it has raised new questions and created ambiguities not anticipated by the drafters. The frequency of appeals to the Montana
Supreme Court, the question of whether the Montana Administrative Procedure Act applies to workers' compensation trials, and the
uncertain relationship of the Workers' Compensation Court to the
judiciary reflect some of the continuing problems facing the Montana court.
The so-called "workers' compensation scandal" resulted from
an audit 2 conducted by the legislative auditor of the Division of
Workers' Compensation.2 The audit found that one of the key
problems with the agency, and a factor from which many of the
scandal's controversies and resulting penal violations arose, was the
dual role assumed by the division's administrator. He was charged
with the fair administration and enforcement of workers' compensation laws, as well as the administration and primary execution of
the state insurance fund program - the largest single insurance
company underwriting workers' compensation insurance in Montana. The dual roles played by the administrator posed an inherent
conflict of interest. On the one hand, the administrator had responsibility for adjudicating an injured worker's claim, while, at the
same time, he acted as an adversary since he had the responsibility
for making certain that the insurance program maintained its integrity and was wisely managed.'
The auditor's report also disclosed several other problems.
Lump sum settlements, as contemplated by statute, 5 had become
the rule rather than the exception, as required by case law.' The
report criticized the methods of negotiating compromise settlements, the lack of documentation, and the administrator's personal
involvement in disputes. The report also detailed aspects of internal procedure and organization that were considered improper or
inappropriate.7
As a direct result of the audit, the Forty-third Legislature
2. Department of Labor and Industry, Workmen's Compensation Division, Report on
Review of Certain Insurance and Disability Compensation Operations, prepared by the Office of the Legislative Auditor (June 1974) [hereinafter cited as Compensation Report].
3. Any designation of "board" with reference to the Industrial Accident Board was
replaced with "division" by 1975 Mont. Laws ch. 23. The designation "workmen's" was likewise changed to "workers'." Hereinafter these new designations will be applied whenever
appropriate.
4. Compensation Report, supra note 2, at 134-42.
5. MCA § 39-71-741 (1979).
6. Davis v. Industrial Accident Bd., 92 Mont. 503, 507, 15 P.2d 919, 921 (1932).
7. Compensation Report, supra note 2, at 134-42.
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passed Senate Joint Resolution 708 and House Joint Resolution 53'
which mandated the formation of a select committee on workers'
compensation. These resolutions directed the select committee to
make recommendations to the legislature based on the legislative
auditor's report.
The select committee's recommendations were enacted by the
legislature. The legislation removed the adjudication process from
the Division of Workers' Compensation and placed it in the Office
of the Workers' Compensation Judge. The judge was given the
power to adjudicate disputes between claimants and insurers" and
to disapprove an order of the division administrator allowing a full
and final compromise settlement of a claim for compensation."
The legislation also eliminated the adjudicatory function of the Division of Workers' Compensation as to industrial accidents and the
2
review or appellate function of the district courts of the state.
I. PROCEEDINGS

A.

Overview

The Workers' Compensation Court has been variously described as administrative, 3 quasi-judicial, 4 and judicial. 5 Appeals
from the court are made directly to the Montana Supreme Court,"
but the court proceeds in accordance with the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, where "appropriate."'" The original subject
matter jurisdiction of the court is limited to trials of industrial disputes," but the court also acts as an appellate court for occupational disease" and crime victims compensation." The court is at8. 1974 Mont. Laws, S.J. Res. 70.
9.
10.
11.
12.

1974 Mont. Laws, H.J. Res. 53.
MCA § 39-71-2905 (1979).
MCA § 39-71-2908 (1979).
MCA § 39-71-2904 (1979). The former appellate procedure through the district
court, codified at REvisED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] § 92833, was repealed by 1975 Mont. Laws ch. 537.
13. Hert v. J.J. Newberry Co., - Mont. __, 584 P.2d 656, reh. denied, - Mont. __, 587
P.2d 11 (1978).
14. Skrukrud v. Gallatin Laundry Co., - Mont. -, 557 P.2d 278, 280 (1976).
15. 38 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 27 (1979).
16. MCA § 39-71-2904 (1979).
17. MCA § 39-71-2903 (1979).
18. MCA § 39-71-2905 (1979).
19. MCA § 39-72-702 (1979). An appeal from a final determination by the Division of
Workers' Compensation as to benefits to which a claimant is entitled under provisions of the
Occupational Disease Act, is made to the Workers' Compensation Judge. He may set aside
the division's determination only when it is
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
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tached to the Department of Administration under the executive
branch for "administrative purposes" only.2 Its budget is subject
to approval by the legislature.
For operational purposes, the court is divided into three general divisions: (1) the administrative division, which consists of the
clerk of court, deputy clerk of court, and a legal secretary; (2) the
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
MCA § 39-72-612(2) (1979). See note 137 infra. No provision is made in the statute for appeal from the decision of the Workers' Compensation Judge.
20. MCA § 53-9-131 (1979). A claimant may appeal to the Workers' Compensation
Judge for review of a final determination made by the Division of Workers' Compensation
concerning any claims made under the Crime Victims Compensation Act. MCA tit. 53, ch. 9
(1979). Section 53-9-131(2), however, refers specifically to the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, MCA §§ 2-4-101 through -711 (1979), for the conduct of the hearing and provides
identical supreme court review of disputes arising under the Workers' Compensation Act.
MCA § 53-9-131(3) (1979). This statutory provision contrasts with review procedures under
the Occupational Disease Act. MCA tit. 39, ch. 72 (1979).
21. MCA § 2-15-1014(1) (1979). MCA § 2-15-121 (1979) defines the phrase "for administrative purposes only" in the following manner:
Allocation for administrativepurposes only.
(1) An agency allocated to a department for administrative purposes only in this
chapter shall:
(a) exercise its quasi-judicial, quajsi-legislative, licensing, and policymaking functions independently of the department and without approval or control of the
department;
(b) submit its budgetary requests through the department;
(c) submit reports required of it by law or by the governor through the
department.
(2) The department to which an agency is allocated for administrative purposes
only in this title shall:
(a) direct and supervise the budgeting, record keeping, reporting, and related administrative and clerical functions of-the agency;
(b) include the agency's budgetary requests in the departmental budget;
(c) collect all revenues for the agency and deposit them in the proper fund or
account. Except as provided in 37-1-101, the department may not use or divert the
revenues from the fund or account for purposes other than provided by law.
(d) provide staff for the agency. Unless otherwise indicated in this chapter, the
agency may not hire its own personnel.
(e) print and disseminate for the agency any required notices, rules, or orders
adopted, amended, or repealed by the agency.
(3) The department head of a department to which any agency is allocated for
administrative purposes only in this chapter shall:
(a) represent the agency in communications with the governor;
(b) allocate office space to the agency as necessary, subject to the approval of the
department of administration.
This statute apparently gives the Department of Administration considerable control over
the Office of the Workers' Compensation Judge. Cf. 38 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 27 (1979), concluding that that the Workers' Compensation Court and all its employees are members of
the judicial branch and independent from the Department .of Administration.
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adjudication division, which includes a hearing examiner appointed by the judge at his discretion to hear special cases, and
which is headed by a chief hearing examiner; and (3) the court reporter whose function is similar to that of a district court reporter.
The Office of the Workers' Compensation Judge began operating in June of 1975 and has since that date been located in Helena.
The judge generally has had exclusive state-wide jurisdiction of
workers' compensation disputes, although until 1979 there was
some question as to the jurisdiction that could be exercised simultaneously by the district courts. The 1979 Legislature apparently
settled this question by providing that the Workers' Compensation
Court would have exclusive jurisdiction.1 The Montana Supreme
Court has stated in this connection that prior to any procedures in
district court, a workers' compensation matter should be brought
to the Workers' Compensation Court for a determination of
whether or not a claimant has been injured in the course of
employment."
The legislature has indicated its general satisfaction with the
operation of the court, at least by implication. In 1977, an effort
was made to reduce the court from the status of a district court to
that of an administrative hearing office.2 The effort was killed in
committee through the combined efforts of the Montana AFL-CIO,
the Governor's Office, the State Bar of Montana, and individual
lobbyists.
Despite the apparent approval given by the legislature, the expressed goal of reducing the number of appeals has not been realized. Court records indicate that the supreme court heard an average of six appeals per year from 1970 through 1974, yet has heard a
total of seventy-nine (an average of eighteen per year) since the
inception of the Workers' Compensation Court. The figures do not
necessarily mean the court has failed, however. Since 1973 the benefits available to an injured claimant have been extended to a period as long as the claimant's lifetime2 and to include both com22. 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 63, § 4 amended MCA § 39-71-2905 (1979) to give the Workers! Compensation Judge "exclusive jurisdiction to make determinations concerning disputes
under Chapter 71."
23. Jacques v. Nelson, - Mont. _, 591 P.2d 186 (1979).
24. In the Forty-fifth Legislature, Senators William Murray and William Lowe introduced Senate Bill 330. This bill would have amended MCA § 2-15-1014 (1979) to make the
appointment of the Workers' Compensation Judge subject to confirmation by the Senate,
and eliminate the judicial nominating procedures that are part of the current appointment
process, codified at MCA tit. 3, ch. 1, part 10 (1979). The bill also would have eliminated the
requirement that the Workers' Compensation Judge have the same qualifications and salary
as district court judges. The current retirement benefits would have been similarly excised.
25. MCA § 39-71-702 (1979).
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pensation and medical payments.n In addition, the 1975
Legislature provided that all agricultural workers z7 would be covered by workers' compensation. There are very few workers in Montana now excluded from the act. Arguably, the increased number of
appeals reflects the increase in benefits and number of workers covered by the act.
B. How the Court Functions
The act creating the Office of Workers' Compensation Judge
provides the following: the judge must have the same qualifications
as a district court judge, n devote full time to his office and not
engage in the private practice of law, 2 maintain the principal office
in Helena,30 employ such people as may be necessary to carry out
his duties,"' and conduct proceedings according to the Montana
Administrative Procedure Act.12 The act also provides that the
judge is not bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence,3 nor by any portion of the Administrative Procedure Act
that pertains to appeals.u
The court at present hears an average of 18.75 petitions per
month. The petitions are filed by claimant employees or insurers.
As might be expected, the majority of cases are filed by employees,
nearly all of whom are represented by counsel. The court assists
claimants who have no counsel, but their limited record of success
attests to the need for representation by someone who understands
workers' compensation law and the medical aspects of industrial
accidents.3s The procedure to be followed by the unrepresented
claimant is simple. He need only write a letter in his own words
requesting relief of the court. A member of the clerk's staff will
respond to the claimant and advise him as to how to proceed with
the dispute."
26. MCA § 39-71-704 (1979).
27. MCA § 39-71-118 (1979). Agricultural workers are included under coverage of the
act by virtue of the fact that they are not excluded from the statutory definition of
"employee."
28. MCA § 2-15-1014(3)(a) (1979).
29. MCA § 2-15-1014(3)(b) (1979).
30. MCA § 39-71-2901 (1979).
31. MCA § 39-71-2902 (1979).
32. MCA § 39-71-2903 (1979).
33. Id.
34. MCA § 39-71-2904 (1979).
35. Of a total of three claimants who sought relief by their own efforts, only one made
any recovery.

36. N. GROSFIELD, WORKERS' COMPENSATION MANUAL, State Bar of Montana § 13.32
(1979) [hereinafter cited as MONTANA WORKERS' COMPENSATION MANUAL]. This manual details the requisite procedures to present a petition of a disputed claim before the Workers'
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Regardless of who files the petition, the clerk of court examines
it to see if it meets the requirements of Rule 1 of the Procedural
Rules of Court." If the petition qualifies, the clerk mails a notice to
the parties which informs them of the time and place of the pretrial conference and the trial.38 Even though the petition of an unrepresented claimant seldom meets the requirements of Rule 1, the
clerk follows the same procedure.
Parties to a Workers' Compensation Court hearing can predict
the time and place of the hearing by referring to Rule 8 of the Procedural Rules of Court which sets forth the court's scheduling
mechanism.39 Except for emergency hearings, all cases are expected
to be conducted at the time and place provided 'Or in R-ule 8. Parties may, however, stipulate to a different time and place for their
hearing if the court consents. The court may continue the matter
at the pretrial conference or at the hearing, but only after hearing
evidence which shows that the delay will not inflict further hardship on the claimant, even when the claimant himself requests the
continuance. 40 A continuance is seldom granted to the insurer unless the claimant is receiving compensation or is employed and not
entitled to the biweekly compensation payments.
The pretrial conference is attended by the court-appointed
hearing examiner or the judge and by the parties to the disputed
claim.1 The conference establishes the issues to be resolved at trial
and uncontested issues of fact and law are stipulated. A pretrial
order is prepared, usually by defense counsel, which sets out the
Compensation Court. In addition, the manual contains a comprehensive summary of Montana case law in the field of workers' compensation, and provides samples of many of the
forms and documents to be used in presenting a petition for hearing.
37. PROCEDURAL RULEs OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COuiT, Rule 1 [hereinafter
cited as W. Comp. CT. R.]. A copy of these rules is contained in the "Blue Book" published
by the Division of Workers' Compensation. This publication is sold by the division and may
be obtained by writing to the executive secretary. The rules are also published in the Montana Lawyers' Rule Book or they may be obtained by writing to the Clerk of the Workers'
Compensation Court, P.O. Box 4127, Helena, MT 59601. A copy from the court will be furnished at no cost. Finally, the rules are also published in the Montana Administrative Register 504 (Issue No. 11, 1979). The Administrative Rules of Montana uses a confusing decimal
numbering system. For clarity and simplicity, the numbering system used hereinafter will be
that employed in the "Blue Book."
38. MCA § 2-4-601 (1979) is the portion of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act
relating to notice. See W. COMP. CT. R. 8.
39. W. COMP. CT. R. 8.
40. W. COMP. CT. R. 14.
41. Pretrial conferences are not always held. Time limitations may prevent the conferences in some cases. In the Miles City and Glasgow areas, which include most of the counties in eastern Montana, pretrial conferences are part of the hearing. The present caseload in
those areas has not justified the time and expense involved in holding a separate pretrial
conference. Emergency hearings are never accompanied by a pretrial conference.
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facts according to Rule 12 .1 The order forces the parties to clarify
and narrow the issues and encourages settlement where it appears
desirable.,3
The trial is usually conducted twenty-one days after the pretrial conference and follows the format and procedure of a non-jury
trial. Proper foundation is required for all witnesses and exhibits
formally presented at trial." All proceedings at trial are of record.
Upon completion of the trial, the court may request proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and briefs from counsel, and will
issue its own findings and conclusions after all proposals and briefs
have been submitted.4

C.

Areas of Ambiguity

1. Administrative or Judicial Tribunal?
a.

View of the Adjudicatory Process in Other States

In an overview of workers' compensation procedures across the
nation, Arthur Larson states that the initial handling of disputed
claims for compensation, and perhaps also the initial review, are
considered administrative processes in all but a few states. 4 The
administrative process was selected over the judicial in order to rid
workers' compensation disputes of cumbersome procedure and
pleadings and to facilitate reaching a proper decision by the shortest possible route. At the same time, however, the scope of the
commissions' tribunals definitely fall "toward the judicial end of
the spectrum"' 7 with their jurisdiction and authority being that
42. W. COMP. CT. R. 12, reads as follows:
Pretrialconference. (1) A pretrial conference shall precede every trial unless otherwise ordered by the court. (2) The court shall make an order which recites the
action taken at the conference and shall set forth the following:
(a) statement of jurisdiction pursuant to 39-71-2905 MCA;
(b) motions of either party;
(c) uncontested facts which the parties may agree are true and which will require
no proof;
(d) issues of fact and law;
(e) exhibits which may be introduced;
(f) witnesses which may be called;
(g) pretrial discovery desired, i.e. depositions, interrogatories;
(h) estimated length of trial, time and place; and
(i) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the matter.
43. MONTANA WORKERS' COMPENSATION MANUAL § 13.44.
44. Id. at §§ 13.51 to 13.55. See also W. COMP. CT. R. 15.
45. W. COMP. CT. R. 17.
46. A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 78.10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
LARSON].
47. Id. § 79.90.
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granted by the states' legislatures.' 8
The functions of the compensation boards and commissions
are, however, in many cases recognized as judicial in nature. 9 In
Pigeon v.Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.,50 for example, the
Massachusetts court stated that the Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board was not a court and its members were not judicial officers. Nevertheless, the court determined that:
The power to take testimony and make rulings of law which are
subject to review by the judicial department of the government
goes far to indicate that in performing those functions they are to
be guided and controlled by the same general principles which
would govern judicial officers in discharging the same duties.5'
In Bonafield v. Cahill,52 a New Jersey judge of the workmen's
compensation division sought to vacate his suspension for allegedly
practicing law contrary to the statutory authority by asserting that
he was a judicial officer and therefore removable only by impeachment.5s The New Jersey court stated that a compensation judge
could not be classified as a judicial officer since a "hallmark of a
48. Industrial Comm'n v. Superior Court, 5 Ariz.App. 100, 103, 423 P.2d 375, 378
(1967); Robinson v. Zurich Ins. Co., 131 Ga.App. 796, 796, 207 S.E.2d 209, 209-10 (1974);
Johnson v. Kostis Fruit Co., 281 A.2d 318, 320 (Me. 1971).
49. Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 P. 491, 493 (1916);
Gawith v. Gage's Plumbing and Heating Co., 206 Kan. 169, 179-80, 476 P.2d 966, 974-75
(1970); In re Haley, 356 Mass. 678, 682, 255 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1970). In Kaiser v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 109 Cal.2d 54, 240 P.2d 57, 59 (1952), the California Supreme Court said
that the Industrial Accident Commission exercises judicial powers in the legal sense as a
court.
The Oklahoma legislature gave the State Industrial Commission a new designation as
an Industrial Court by OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 91 (West 1971). This statute designated
the court as a court of record and gave the judges thereof the same prerogatives and powers
as judges of other courts of record in the state. The Rules of the Court were revised in 1976
to make them conform, except as otherwise provided in the Workers' Compensation Act, to
the rules of pleading and practice applicable in the state district courts. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 85 ch. 4, App., Rule 2 (West 1971). These sections were construed together in National
Zinc Co. v. Sparger, 560 P.2d 292 (Okla. 1977) to give the Industrial Court powers similar to
those of district courts. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 91 was repealed by 1977 Okla. Sess.
Laws, ch. 234, § 62.
50. 216 Mass. 51, 102 N.E. 932 (1913).
51. Id. at 56, 102 N.E. at 935.
52. 125 N.J. Super. 78, 308 A.2d 386 (1973).
53. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 15-49 (1937) provides that compensation judges be appointed
by the governor, confirmed by the senate, and serve during good behavior. The New Jersey
court in Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 365, 66 A.2d 726 (1949)
and Campbell v. Department of Civil Serv., 39 N.J..556, 189 A.2d 712 (1963) had held that
the workmen's compensation division could not be classified as a court. Even though the
division had acquired many of the attributes of a court, it was still considered to be outside
the scope of the judicial article of the state constitution. The court held in Bonafield that the
statutory change in designation from "commissioner" to "judge" was a change only in nomenclature, not in status. Bonafield, 125 N.J. Super. at 85, 308 A.2d at 389.
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judge is his independence and freedom from interference and control by any authority outside the judicial establishment."' 5
A similar view of the workers' compensation adjudicatory process is found in Nevada. The Nevada procedure for determining
contested claims is much like that used in Montana except that
claims are heard before an appeals officer appointed by the governor.55 Several claimants disputed the constitutionality of the Nevada procedure in Nevada Industrial Commission v. Reese,"6 charging that it amounted to an impermissible delegation of judicial
powers to an executive agency. The principal argument raised in
Reese had been that the new 1973 legislative amendments incorporating the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act into the Industrial Insurance Act and providing for the appointment of an appeals officer was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
The Nevada court dismissed the argument relying in part upon
Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 57 in which
the New Jersey court stated that the "failure to comprehend that
administrative adjudication is not judicial springs from the erroneous notion that all adjudication is judicial.

' 58

The Nevada Su-

preme Court also held in Reese that the appeals officer was permitted to "exercise his administrative powers that are quasi-judicial in
nature without violating the separation of powers doctrine."59
The Florida Industrial Relations Commission was recognized
as being a judicial tribunal in Scholastic Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup.10
In that case the Florida Supreme Court relied on a prior decision8 '
54. Bonafield, 125 N.J. Super. at 84, 308 A.2d at 389. According to the New Jersey
statutory scheme, the compensation judge is subject to control by the New Jersey Commissioner of Labor and Industry insofar as he (1) controls where the judge sits, (2) determines
the nature and extent of the judge's caseload, and (3) prescribes the rules of practice and
procedure to be followed by the court. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 1A-3, 1-20, 1A-11, 54: 14B-3(2)
(1937). Additionally, the statute which defines the term "judge" makes no reference to the
workmen's compensation judge. Id. §§ 2A: 1B-1 et seq. The method of appeal from the workmen's compensation judge's decision is identical to appeals from other administrative decisions. Id. § 34: 15-66. Cf. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 111-132 (West 1937); NEE. REV. STAT. §§ 48-152
through 48-185 (1978 Reissue). Both the California and Nebraska statutory schemes include
comprehensive provisions for adjudication of workers' compensation disputes. Extensive
power is granted to the compensation tribunal and indicates that the adjudicaton process is
considered judicial in nature.
55. NEV. REv. STAT. § 616.542 (1975).
56. 93 Nev. 115, 560 P.2d 1352 (1977).
57. 2 N.J. 356, 66 A.2d 726 (1949).
58. Id. at 364, 66 A.2d at 730.
59. Reese, 93 Nev. at 120, 560 P.2d at 1356.
60. 307 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1975). See Rotter, Florida Industrial Relations Commission:
More than an Administrative Agency, 29 U. MiAmi L. REv. 798, 804-05 (1975), discussing
Scholastic Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup.
61. In re Florida Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 285 So.2d 601 (Fla.
1973).
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and cited Black's Law Dictionary as authority for determining the
meaning of "judicial function," "judicial power," and the term
"judge*."" The court did not, however, classify the Industrial Relations Commission as a court since creation of unenumerated courts
is prohibited by the Florida constitution.0 The court concluded,
"Orders of the IRC [Industrial Relations Commission] are not administrative actions, but are judicial functions in their reviews of
' 4
workmen's compensation appeals."
The foregoing discussion indicates that other jurisdictions
which have examined workers' compensation adjudicatory
processes view the proceedings as being primarily administrative in
n~ature.

LJLJLCir. 1

a

LV%;VrJUL1Ofl1J,

JIiOw6ver,

LUOL.
uat-

S-0y area

LIVLWVVIA

judicial and administrative functions exists with respect to compensation adjudication. Since the creation of the Workers' Compensation Court, the Montana Supreme Court has tended to adopt
this middle view.
b.

Montana's View of the Adjudication Process

The Montana Supreme Court has stated that the intent of
workers' compensation legislation is to protect injured workers and
their dependents, as well as to determine employers' liability. " Re62. Scholastic Systems, 307 So.2d at 169-70.
63. Id. at 170. See FLA. CONST. art I, § 9. The judicial nature of the IRC proceedings
was recognized in Scholastic Systems as satisfying the Florida constitution's due process
requirements.
The Nebraska standard for judicial review of Workmens' Compensation Court decisions
is unusual in that it has been legislatively, not judicially adopted. The statutory scheme is
also unusual in that apparently the Nebraska Supreme Court has not considered whether or
not the Workmen's Compensation Court is judicial or administrative in nature. Interestingly, the scheme ties the Workmens' Compensation Court to the judiciary article of the
Nebraska constitution. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-152 (1978 Reissue). Cf. MONT. CONsT. art.
7, § 1 providing: "The judicial power of the state is vested in one supreme court, district
courts, justice courts and such other courts as may be provided by law." MCA § 3-1-101
(1979), however, provides:
The following are courts of justice of this state:
1) The court of impeachment, which is the senate;
2) the supreme court;
3) the district courts;
4) the justice courts;
5) the city courts and such other inferior courts as the legislature may establish
in any incorporated city or town.
This statute is based on a California statute. The jurisdiction of none of these enumerated
courts corresponds with that of the Workers' Compensation Court. In creating the Workers'
Compensation Court, the Montana legislature made no reference to MCA sections defining
the powers of the district courts. The legislation also made no reference to the judiciary
article of the state constitution.
64. Scholastic Systems, 307 So.2d at 171 (court's emphasis).
65. State ex rel. Morgan v. Industrial Accident Bd., 130 Mont. 272, 279, 300 P.2d 954,
957 (1956).
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lief is intended to be expeditious and without regard to proof of
fault.66 Additionally, the legislation is designed to shift the burden
and cost of industrial accidents to the industry itself and to "secure
prompt payment of compensation for such injuries by a simple and
inexpensive method of procedure." 7
To realize these legislative goals, it is important that the adjudication of disputes remains a relatively simple procedure. This is
particularly true whenever an insurer contests the validity of a
claim. If the adjudication process cannot expeditiously resolve a
dispute, the goals of the legislation will be frustrated. In enacting
House Bill 100 in 1975, the legislature faced the conflict of maintaining this simple, expeditious process and eliminating abuses
that had developed with the adjudication procedures.
When the Office of the Workers' Compensation Judge was first
created, the court proceeded with very vague guidelines to establish the court under the statutory mandate. Counsel for the legislative committee proposed that the court proceed according to Montana guidelines for adjudication found in the Administrative
Procedure Act." This proposal was not without its problems, however. Because appeals from the court are made to the supreme
court' and the language of MCA § 39-71-2903 (1979) provides that
the court is bound by the "appropriate" 70 provisions of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, the precise nature of the court
was unclear. Also, the directive that the Office of Workers' Compensation Judge is not bound by common law and statutory rules
of evidence 71 indicates that proceedings before the compensation
court differ from proceedings in district court.
Since the creation of the Workers' Compensation Court, the
relationship of the court to the judicial and executive branches of
government has not been satisfactorily clarified. The legislation
creating the court did not expressly provide how the court should
operate in relation to the judicial branch of government. Even the
Montana Supreme Court has had difficulty classifying what kind of
72
tribunal the Workers' Compensation Court is or ought to be.

The Interim Study Report 7 prepared by the select committee
on workers' compensation in contemplation of amending the adju66. Id. at 286, 300 P.2d at 962.
67. Id. at 288, 300 P.2d at 963.
68. MCA tit. 2, ch. 4, parts 6 and 7 (1979).
69. MCA § 39-71-2904 (1979).
70. MCA § 39-71-2903 (1979).
71. Id.
72. See discussion infra at notes 80-84.
73. MONTANA LEGISLATIVE CoUrcN., INTRIM STuny oF Tm SauCT COMMITrEE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (December 1974).
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dicatory procedures indicates the committee's conviction that the
office of the Workers' Compensation Court should be judicial in nature.' The committee's report, however, reflects vacillation in its
perception of the court. For example, two alternative disqualification procedures were proposed for inclusion in the legislation: one
patterned after the disqualification procedure found in the Montana Administrative Procedure Act and one patterned after the disqualification-by-right procedure used in district courts. The committee rejected the disqualification-by-right procedure on grounds
that such a procedure "would defeat the purpose of having a [workers'] compensation judge with special expertise."'7 The members
felt that no great harm was done by leaving it to the judge's discretion whether to disqualify himself.7' The entire disqualification provision was eliminated from the final text of the legislation creating
the judge's office.
The appeal procedure recommended and adopted also distinguishes the Workers' Compensation Court from other administrative agencies. Besides expediting the adjudication process, the
committee members wanted to reduce expenses. In proposing an
appeals procedure, the select committee decided in favor of direct
appeal to the supreme court for several reasons:
First, the members sought to have an injured worker's claim adjudicated as expeditiously as possible and they felt this would help
speed up final adjudications. Second, since the [workers'] compensation judge would not only have all the qualifications of a
district court judge but also be an expert in his field, the committee members felt that an appeal to the district court would not
only be merely a lateral movement but that it would also cause

unnecessary expense and delay. Third, since the judge will be an
expert in the field of [workers'] compensation, the committee
members felt that there would not be a great volume of cases
appealed."

The change in the appellate process brought the wheel full circle. Originally industrial accident boards have been instituted because courts adjudicated workers' claims slowly. As Judge John J.
Parker said many years ago:
Workmens' compensation commissions were established very
largely because the courts were not handling efficiently the claims

arising out of industrial accidents and it was felt that they would
74.

Id. at 6.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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not administer the compensation acts as efficiently as administrative bodies."
The Montana Supreme Court, though not expressly, has indicated that it views the Workers' Compensation Court somewhere
between an administrative and judicial agency. In Skrukrud v.
Gallatin Laundry Co., 7' the first appeal from the Workers' Compensation Court, the supreme court characterized the Workers'
Compensation Court as "administrative in nature and quasi-judicial." 8 Stevens v. 4 B's Restaurant, Inc." followed this holding. In
Hert v. J. J. Newberry Co.," the court again affirmed this concept,
recognizing that decisions of the compensation court are appealable
directly to the supreme court, contrary to other administrative proceedings and additionally that the "only opportunity for a worker,
an employer, or a carrier to obtain an evidentiary hearing with a
record for review respecting the subject in dispute . . . is the hearing that is held before the Workers' Compensation judge." '
The Montana Attorney General also has made an assessment
of the Workers' Compensation Court. After reviewing all of the appropriate statutory provisions, he concluded the following:
[The] only viable alternative to finding the Office of Workers'
Compensation Judge as part of the judiciary is to declare it to be
an administrative agency which possesses quasi-judicial powers.
However . . . there are numerous factors which distinguish the
position from other administrative agencies and indicates the legislature intended to grant more than quasi-judicial authority."
An analysis of these various opinions does not provide a satisfactory conclusion about the nature of the Montana Workers' Compensation Court. Although future events may require the Montana
Supreme Court to analyze the role of the court in more detail, as of
the present time, the uncertain nature of the workers' compensation adjudicatory process has not detracted from the effectiveness
and near universal approval accorded the court.
3.

Presentationof Evidence in Compensation Proceedings
Despite the statutory provision that the court is "not bound by

78.
(5th ed.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

AMEwcAN BAR AssOCIATON, THE IMPOVEMENT OF THE ADMNISTRATION OF JUSTICE 5

1971).
171 Mont. 217, 557 P.2d 278 (1976).
Id. at 221, 557 P.2d at 280.
Mont.
575 P.2d 1326 (1978).
Mont. -, 584 P.2d 656 (1978), reh. denied,
Hert, - Mont. -., 587 P.2d at 12.
38 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 27 (1979).
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the common law and statutory rules of evidence," the supreme
court has increasingly applied rules of evidence to compensation
decisions. Before the court was created, hearings conducted by the
Board of Industrial Accidents were to be governed by rules of practice and procedure adopted by the board, not by technical rules of
evidence."6 More than one-half of all the states' statutory schemes
provide that common law and statutory rules of evidence do not
apply in compensation proceedings." Compensation boards do not
have an unfettered rein on the manner in which a disputed claim
may be adjudicated, however. The generally adopted New York
view is that a "residuum of legal evidence" will be required that
would be considered competent by common law standards to uphold an award of compensation benefits." Industrial commissions
usually become adept and knowledgeable with respect to the evidence, particularly medical evidence, as it relates to industrial ac0 the Montana Sucidents."9 In Ross v. Industrial Accident Board,1
preme Court deferred to this expertise and recognized the board's
superior advantage in considering the credibility of witnesses,9 ' and
held that the board was bound, just as the courts are bound, if the
record contains uncontroverted credible evidence2
The kind of evidence that will support an award and the standard of review of that evidence on appeal have been matters of
some confusion, particularly in the case of hearsay evidence. The
general rule in Montana has been that evidence will not be excluded in a compensation proceeding because it is hearsay, even
though such evidence would be inadmissible in a judicial proceeding. 3 By means of contrast, in California, even though the statutes
provide that the commission is not bound by technical rules of evidence, the judicial rule against hearsay evidence is considered to be
more than a technicality and cannot be dispensed with by
4
statute.
85. MCA § 39-71-2903 (1979).
86. R.C.M. 1947, § 92-812 provided that proceedings conducted by the Industrial Accident Board were to be governed by rules of practice and procedure adopted by the board, not
by technical rules of evidence. This section was repealed by 1975 Mont. Laws ch. 537, § 7.
See Annot., 87 A.L.R. 777 (1933).
87. LARSON supra note 46, § 79.30.
88. Id.
89. LARSON supra note 46, § 79.53.
90. 106 Mont. 486, 80 P.2d 362 (1938).
91. Id. at 495, 80 P.2d at 364.
92. Id.
93. Ross v. Industrial Accident Bd., 106 Mont. 486, 494-95, 80 P.2d 362, 364 (1938);
Bergan v. Gallatin Valley Milling Co., 138 Mont. 27, 30, 353 P.2d 320, 321 (1960).
94. Englebretson v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 170 Cal. 793, 151 P. 421, 432 (1915).
See generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 12 (1971).
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In Bergan v. Gallatin Valley Milling Co.,1 5 the Montana court
allowed hearsay evidence to be introduced, stating that in compensation cases it has consistently disregarded technical rules of evidence and has- liberally construed the compensation act in favor of
the claimant. The claimant in Montana must still establish his
case and bear the burden of proof by a "preponderance of evidence." However, the evidence may include hearsay and the sufficiency of the evidence is determined by the board."
The hearsay exception often lies at the heart of compensation
proceedings. The theory is that all evidence ought to be allowed to
be presented before the tribunal hearing the dispute. The tribunal
then weighs and evaluates, exercising its discretion and superior
knowledge to determine the award or order. The hearsay exception
is particularly important in terms of medical evidence, which often
takes the form of unsworn letters, reports, and other documents.
In Hert v. J. J. Newberry Co., 7 the Montana court departed
from the previously recognized practice which allowed hearsay
medical evidence in compensation proceedings. Until Hert and
under the prior practices before the board, the examining tribunal
took judicial notice of the entire contents of the claimant's file as
compiled by the Division of Workers' Compensation. The file often
contained medical reports, recommendations, evaluations and
course of treatment, and rates of impairment or disability-all in
the form of unsworn documents. The court or the board considered
the contents of the file for whatever value they had without attaching any particular significance or credibility to any of that information. In Hert, the court held that the compensation court cannot
take judicial notice of non-adjudicative facts, citing Rule 201(a)
and (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 The court stated, "Disputed medical conclusions by doctors contained in medical reports
cannot be judicially noticed. . . . Judicial notice cannot supply evidence in the form of unsworn, hearsay testimony in letters, absent
agreement of the parties.""
The court's position was clarified on a petition for rehearing
where the court stated, in addition, "The Workers' Compensation
judge is specifically exempted from common law and statutory
rules of evidence. . . . This exception, however, does not apply to
the right to cross-examination, which is a fundamental right and
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

138 Mont. 27, 353 P.2d 320 (1960).
Id. at 31, 353 P.2d at 321.
Mont. -, 584 P.2d 656 reh. denied, Id. at -, 584 P.2d at 662.
Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/1

Mont. _

587 P.2d 11 (1978).

16

1980]

Hunt and Luinstra: Workers’ Compensation Court

WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT

not an evidentiary rule."'0 The court recognized that the compensation court is the last opportunity for an evidentiary hearing
before supreme court review. 0'
The court also criticized the manner in which the medical evidence was introduced at the hearing. The court concluded that the
only evidence to support the finding of the compensation court was
in the form of medical information which was not properly exchanged with either the Workers' Compensation Court or with opposing counsel, contrary to Rule 10 of the Procedural Rules of
Court and that the author of the medical information was not produced at trial, making the report clearly hearsay evidence. 02 While
the court attempted to distinguish Hert from prior decisions,0 3 the
distinctions are far from clear. The Workers' Compensation Court
is no longer free to consider evidence that each party has not had
the opportunity to rebut. Hert also limits to some extent the discretion with which the Workers' Compensation Judge is allowed to
view the evidence offered at hearing. The doctrine of judicial notice
will extend only to undisputed facts.'04
The problems raised in the Hert decision have been obviated
to a large extent by implementing new practices to prevent evidence from getting into the record without the opportunity to
cross-examine the author of the document. The file maintained by
100. - Mont. __, 587 P.2d at 12. The supreme court had previously recognized the
Hert principle in Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, 166 Mont. 17, 530 P.2d 433 (1975). There
the Industrial Accident Board, unable to reconcile conflicting medical reports, asked for and
received a written report favorable to the claimant. The insurance company appealed the
award of disability, charging it had had no opportunity to cross-examine the author of the
report. The court recognized that the rules of evidence were more relaxed in compensation
proceedings, but held that the board was still bound by the due process requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment which provides that the opposing party must have reasonable opportunity to meet and rebut the evidence offered. Id. at 23, 530 P.2d at 437.
101. - Mont. __, 587 P.2d at 12.
102. Id. at -, 587 P.2d at 13.
103. Hert, while not expressly doing so, effectively overruled several prior decisions
regarding the hearsay exception. In Brurud v. Judge Moving & Storage, - Mont. __, 563
P.2d 558 (1977), arising prior to the creation of the Workers' Compensaton Court, no medical
evidence was presented at the hearing before the Division of Workers' Compensation although medical reports were contained in the division's file. The supreme court said it was
proper for the examiner to consider the evidence since both parties knew what the reports
said and neither party made objection or offered any rebuttal at the hearing. Id. at -, 563
P.2d 561. The court in Stevens v. Glacier General Assurance Co., - Mont. -_, 575 P.2d 1326
(1978) distinguished medical reports, where the parties are afforded no opportunity to rebut,
and depositions. The court disapproved the practice of filing reports subsequent to the hearing, but approved depositions being taken subsequently to the hearing, citing with apparent
approval W. Comp. Ct. R. 11 providing for such a procedure. Id. at -, 575 P.2d at 1330. See
also Bond v. St. Regis Paper Co., - Mont. -, 571 P.2d 372 (1977)(evidence in the form of
unsworn medical reports could be considered by the workers' compensation court).
104. Hert, - Mont. -, 584 P.2d at 662.
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the Workers' Compensation Court no longer contains information
formerly filed with the division, but instead is initiated with the
filing of the petition for hearing by the claimant. Rule 10,'0 requiring the free exchange of all medical information, is strictly enforced
by the court. Any failure to follow this procedure carries with it the
strong likelihood of dismissal of the petition.
3.

Judicial Review of Workers' Compensation Decisions

The standard of review of compensation awards is an additional area that has undergone slight permutations since the
court's inception. The general standard of review on appeal has
traditionally been the "substantial evidence" test. 06 The standard
in Montana prior to the creation of the Workers' Compensation
Court was similar to the substantial evidence test, although additional evidence was allowed to be introduced at the district court
level proceedings which in some cases became the equivalent of a
07
trial de novo.1
Since the creation of the Workers' Compensation Court, the
supreme court has not altered its articulation of the standard of
review to be used. A decision rendered by the Workers' Compensation Court continues to carry with it a presumption of correctness.
In Jensen v. Zook Brothers Construction Co., lo8the court stated:
The standard of review applicable in determining the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the findings of the Workers' Compensation Court has been stated in this language: "Our function in
reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Court is to
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
findings and conclusions of that court. We cannot substitute our
105. W. Comp. Ct. R. 10.
106. Kimball v. Continental Oil Co., 170 Mont. 86, 550 P.2d 912 (1976); Skrukrud v.
Gallatin Laundry Co., 171 Mont. 217, 557 P.2d 278 (1976); Flansburg v. Pack River Co., __
Mont. -, 561 P.2d 1329 (1977).
107. A good discussion of judicial review of workers' compensation cases prior to the
creation of the Workers' Compensation Court is found in Comment, District Court Judicial
Review in Montana Workmens' Compensation Cases, 30 MoNT. L. REV. 167 (1969). R.C.M.
1947, § 92-834 allowed a trial de novo in compensation cases that were appealed to the
district court. Additional evidence was also allowed to be introduced. This statute created
some question whether the district court could conduct only a review for abuse of discretion
or whether it could retry the issues. The Montana Supreme Court in Dosen v. East Butte
Copper Mining Co., 78 Mont. 579, 254 P. 880 (1927), indicated that the trial would be de
novo only to the extent new evidence was introduced in district court, although the court
vacillated on this position. Sykes v. Republic Coal Co., 94 Mont. 239, 22 P.2d 157, (1933).
Cf. Paulich v. Republic Coal Co., 110 Mont. 174, 102 P.2d 4 (1940) (where the board failed
to hold a hearing, the district court could proceed to make a determination of the dispute in
the first instance).
108. - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 1191 (1978).
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judgment for that of the trial court as to the weight of evidence on
questions of fact. Where there is substantial evidence to support
the findings of the Workers' Compensation Court, this Court cannot overturn the decision."'' 9 (citations omitted)
Even though the standard of review of Workers' Compensation
Court proceedings articulated by the Montana Supreme Court is
the same standard of review for other administrative agency decisions, the supreme court has applied rules of evidence and civil
procedure in reviewing compensation appeals. For example, in
Clark v. Hilde Construction Co., "0 the court held that the claimant
must establish his claim by a preponderance of evidence. But the
court went further, apparently applying rules of evidence to compensation court proceedings. The court cited MCA § 26-1-602
(1979)"' and MCA § 26-1-303(6) (1979), the latter of which provides that:
[i]f weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it appears that stronger and more satisfactory was within the power of
the party, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust."2
Certain rules of civil procedure may also be binding on the
Workers' Compensation Court. In McGee v. Bechtel Corp., " 3 the
supreme court treated the Workers' Compensation Court in effect
as a district court. In that case, the court cited Rule 52(a) of the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, and apparently applied the
"clearly erroneous""' test from that rule.
The court went outside the scope of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act in Dumont v. Wickens Brothers Construction
Co.'" when, for the first time, the court applied rules of appellate
civil procedure as well as other rules of civil procedure to workers'
compensation cases. The Workers' Compensation Court was
109. Id., 582 P.2d at 1193.
110. - Mont. -, 576 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1978).
111. MCA § 26-1-602 (1979) is part of the Montana statutory provisions on evidence
and enumerates disputable presumptions.
112. MCA § 26-1-303(6) (1979) is the statutory instruction to a jury regarding evaluation of evidence.
113. - Mont. -, 595 P.2d 1156 (1979).
114. MONT. R. Civ. P. 52(a) reads in pertinent part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58. . . . Findings of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The "clearly erroneous" test was made applicable to actions tried by district courts and as
well to causes tried before the Workers' Compensation Court in Hert, - Mont. -, 584 P.2d
at 659.
115. - Mont. __, 598 P.2d 1099 (1978).
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treated as a district court
for purposes of filing notice of appeal
6
from a final decision."
Ill.

CONCLUSION

The Montana Workers' Compensation Court, created in 1975
by legislative enactment, is an administrative body organized to
carry out the judicial function of hearing and settling disputed
workers' compensation claims efficiently and effectively. Since its
creation the court has heard a burgeoning number of cases and has
tried to formulate its procedural rules in conformity with the legislative mandate. The legislation has proved to be vague in several
respects, however, including the very nature of the Workers' Compensation Court, and the kind of evidence and manner of its presentation that will be acceptable both to the court and the requirements of due process.
The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the legislature's
provisions numerous times. In its decisions the supreme court has
gone to some lengths to ensure the Workers' Compensation Court a
position somewhere between the executive and judicial branches of
government. In addition, the supreme court's alteration of the
hearsay exception rule and the application of the rules of civil procedure and evidence to workers' compensation proceedings reflect
the increased inclination of the court to regard the Workers' Compensation Court as a judicial entity.

116. The Montana Supreme Court in Dumont applied MoNT. R. App. Civ. P. 4(a), 5,
21(a) and (c) and MoNT.R. Civ. P. 77(d) to Workers' Compensation Court proceedings, the
effect of which is to add three days to the prescribed thirty-day period for filing notice of
appeal of a compensation proceeding where service of notice of final decision of the Workers'
Compensation Court is by mail. The court analogized from the Montana Administrative
Procedure Act, MCA § 2-4-623 (1979), which provides that "[p]arties shall be notified either
personally or by mail of any decision or order. . ." to MoNT.R. Cxv. P. 77(d) which provides
for notice of orders and judgments from the district courts. Dumont, __ Mont. -, 598 P.2d
at 1103-05.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/1

20

